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The 1999 outbreak of Nipah virus encephalitis in hu-
mans and pigs in Peninsular Malaysia ended with the evac-
uation of humans and culling of pigs in the epidemic area. 
Serologic screening showed that, in the absence of infected 
pigs, dogs were not a secondary reservoir for Nipah virus. 
D
uring September 1998–April 1999, a viral disease as-
sociated with pigs resulted in at least 265 human cases 
of febrile encephalitis in Peninsular Malaysia; case-fatality 
ratio was 38% (1). The etiologic agent, Nipah virus (NiV; 
family Paramyxoviridae, genus Henipavirus), is believed 
to have entered pig populations in Perak state, central Ma-
laysia, from a fruit-bat reservoir (2) before spreading by 
transport  of  pigs  among  farms.  Bukit  Pelanduk,  Negeri 
Sembilan state, and adjoining Sepang, Selangor state, had 
the largest number of cases. The epidemic in that region 
was controlled by cessation of animal movement, destruc-
tion of pigs on affected farms, public education, use of 
personal protective equipment, and evacuation of humans 
from and quarantine of farms and villages within the epi-
demic area (3).
Although humans were most frequently infected after 
contact with live pigs (4–6), 8% of patients reported having 
had no direct contact with pigs, which suggests other sourc-
es of transmission to humans. One study reported an as-
sociation with sick or dying dogs; case-patients were more 
likely than controls to report an increase in the number of 
sick or dying animals, including dogs (5).
During the outbreak, evidence of NiV infection was 
found in domestic animals such as goats and cats, but es-
pecially dogs (2). NiV infection was confirmed by immu-
nohistochemical examination of 1 dead and 1 dying dog 
from the epidemic area. Both showed histologic evidence 
of severe disease (7). After pig populations were destroyed 
but before residents were allowed to return to their homes 
in the epidemic area, studies were undertaken to determine 
whether domestic animal populations maintained active in-
fection in the absence of infected pigs. Dogs were especial-
ly suspected because they live commensally with both pigs 
and humans. Many dogs sampled from the Bukit Pelanduk 
and Sepang epidemic area around the time of the pig cull-
ing had antibodies to NiV or a Nipah-like virus (2). To test 
the hypothesis that NiV was being transmitted from dog 
to dog, we looked for evidence of the spread of infection 
among dogs outside the immediate disease-endemic area.
The Study
The disease-epidemic zone in southwestern Malaysia 
was an area of small pig farms associated with a cluster of 
small towns in the states of Negeri Sembilan (Bukit Pelan-
duk, Sungai Nipah, Kampong Sawah) and adjacent Selan-
gor (Sepang) (Figure). For 3 days (May 11–13, 1999), stray 
and pet dogs were sampled along 2 transects following ma-
jor paved roads, through rural areas, leading from the pe-
riphery of the recognized disease-epidemic area (Figure). 
On days 1–3, samples were collected within 15–20, 8–15, 
and 0–8 km, respectively, of each transect.
Sampling  followed  2  methods.  For  household  pets, 
blood samples were collected from the dogs, geographic 
coordinates of the house were measured by using a geo-
graphic positioning system, and owners were asked about 
the animal’s potential exposure history (e.g., where it was 
kept, whether it was allowed to roam, health, diet, any pres-
ence on a pig farm, and if it had been sick during the previ-
ous 12 months). Free-roaming stray dogs without collars 
were killed by animal control personnel following routine 
protocols for rabies control and returned to a field labo-
ratory in Bukit Pelanduk for sampling. Geographic coor-
dinates and form-directed data (sex, age, apparent health) 
were recorded for each stray. A veterinary team collected 
blood and tissue samples (spleen, kidney, liver, lung) from 
each animal.
For comparison, blood samples from 109 dogs from 
the  Kuala  Lumpur  area  (29  from  veterinary  clinics,  19 
from pounds, and 61 stray dogs) were collected. Hendra 
virus (HeV) is highly cross-reactive with NiV and was suc-
cessfully used for initial screening in humans and animals 
during the outbreak (8). Samples were tested by using an 
indirect immunoglobulin (Ig) G ELISA with HeV antigen 
as described (9).
During the 3 days, 249 dogs were sampled; 161 blood 
samples were from pets, and 88 blood and tissue samples 
were from stray dogs. The daily number of samples increased 
along both transects as the study progressed, reflecting the 
improved efficiency of sampling teams (Figure).
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Of  the  249  blood  samples,  4  (1.6%;  2  from  each 
transect)  had  detectable  antibodies  reactive  with  HeV. 
The 56 blood samples from animals 15–20 km from the 
epidemic area had no detectable antibodies. There was 1 
antibody-positive animal in the 8–15 km zone and 3 in the 
0–8-km zone (Figure). Of the 4 antibody-positive dogs, 3 
were pets from the 0–8-km zone. The antibody-positive 
stray was from the 8–15-km zone. The 109 blood samples 
from pet and stray dogs in Kuala Lumpur were HeV anti-
body negative.
Conclusions
The finding that all 109 dogs from Kuala Lumpur (in-
cluding at least 29 vaccinated pets) were antibody nega-
tive indicated that the immunoassay did not detect antibody 
elicited  by  common  canine  vaccines  (canine  distemper, 
hepatitis [adenovirus type II], parainfluenza, leptospira, and 
canine parvovirus) or other common paramyxovirus infec-
tions. The absence of NiV antibody in dogs >15 km from 
the epidemic area and the low prevalence in populations 
nearer the epidemic area provides evidence that the virus 
was not spreading by dog-to-dog transmission and that the 
dog population was not acting as an amplifying reservoir 
for NiV in the absence of infected pigs. In addition, there 
were no reports of unusual numbers of dead or sick dogs 
outside the immediate disease-endemic area.
Infected pigs in the area of the epidemic were destroyed 
March 1–April 16, 1999. Prevalence of NiV antibody in 
63 dogs from within this area April 3–14, 1999, was 57%. 
Prevalence in 19 dogs from the same area April 23–May 
4, 1999, was 26% (unpub. data). Although this reduction 
in prevalence is not significant (p = 0.23, 2-tailed Fisher 
exact test), it suggests that the virus was not being rapidly 
transmitted  among  dog  populations  after  destruction  of 
the pigs. Some of the animals that had been exposed to in-
fected pigs died or were killed and were probably replaced 
by uninfected immigrant dogs. Alternatively, infection in 
the dog population may have been local and patchy, and 
the apparent temporal differences in prevalence may reflect 
geographic sampling bias. Dogs sampled during the earli-
est study period were taken by patrolling animal control 
personnel. The exact locations of sampling are unknown, 
but they were areas abandoned by humans.
The greater number of infected pets than strays reflects 
their greater representation in the sampled population. An-
tibody prevalences (3/161 [1.9%] for pets vs. 1/88 [1.1%] 
for strays) did not differ significantly (p = 1.00, 2-tailed 
Fisher exact test).
Of the 3 antibody-positive pet dogs, none was reported 
to have been sick within the past year, 2 were “always” al-
lowed to roam free, and the third was “rarely” allowed to 
roam free. However, the owners of the third dog reported 
feeding it “pig bones.” We believe that these animals could 
have become infected through direct contact with infected 
pigs or by eating uncooked pork products. Some animals 
classified as strays may have been pets that were allowed to 
roam free without collars.
We cannot exclude the possibility that dogs may have 
remained infectious for some period after infection or that 
other  dogs  or  even  humans  may  have  become  infected 
through contact with infected dogs. However, our results 
indicate that such infection was rare and was insufficient to 
maintain and spread NiV in dog populations in the absence 
of infected pigs. 
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Figure. Sampling locations for 161 pet and 88 stray dogs along 
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